Recently, Jung et al. proposed a robust conditional privacy-preserving 
In this paper, we will propose a novel privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET by using secure identity-based group blind signature, the private encryption system and the public encryption system. The protocol can provide mutual authentication, anonymity and unlinkability under the Random Oracle Model and the DBDH assumption. In addition, TC can trace efficiently malicious OBUs or RSUs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the communication model and privacy of VANET are introduced. We will define mutual authenticated privacy of VANET and some preliminaries are reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the new privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET. In Section 4, the security analysis of this protocol is given. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In the section, we first describe the communication model and privacy of VANET. Next, we review some cryptographic assumptions.
Communication Model
We envision a VANET of many vehicles and roadside devices. Assume that a trusted center, say the transportation administration center, exists in the VANET that gets control over the vehicles and RSUs. The vehicles must register to TC before they are put into use. The difference of our VANET communication model from the VANET communication model [4] is that each communication between the vehicles or between a vehicle and a roadside device need not require the TC to join it. The new communication model can avoid the communication neck bottle of the TC. With limitation of the vehicles' or the roadside devices' wireless capacity and the rapid movement of the vehicles, we assume bi-directional links only meaning two entities (here the entity refers to a vehicle or a roadside device) are considered neighbors if and only if they can communicate with each other or can receive the broadcast message from other entities.
The approach to ensuring privacy in a VANET is to avoid disclosing the identity of the vehicles, which hereafter preserves their location privacy. In the whole VANET, only the TC knows the identity of each vehicle. All the communications between the vehicles or between the vehicles and the roadside devices, including the broadcast of the vehicles are all anonymous. A vehicle must make its pseudo-identity public when a vehicle joins a communication or broadcast. A vehicle changes its pseudo-identity after one communication or broadcast. Furthermore, it is computationally infeasible to obtain the linkage from two different pseudo-identities.
The communications in the VANET are classified into three categories: (1) the communications between the vehicles (Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication ), (2) the communications between one vehicle and RSUs (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication), (3) the broadcast of the vehicles.
Mutual Authenticated Privacy f VANET
For the adversary model, we assume that an adversary holds the strongest power of attacks. That is, the adversary can mount the following attacks: passive attacks such as monitoring all transmission messages happening anywhere in the whole VANET and active attacks such as corrupting some vehicles (OBUs) to obtain their private information, for example, their real identities and secret keys, corrupting some RSUs to obtain the signing key and colluding with some entities.
A VANET is called mutual authenticated privacy-preserving if all the communications in the VANET satisfy the following security properties [7, 8, 9] .
(1) Mutual Authentication. During the vehicle-to-vehicle communications, one OBU can authenticate the pseudo-identity of the other OBU. During the vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, the OBU can verify the validation of the certification issued by the RSU and the identity of the RSU, while the RSU can authenticate the pseudo-identity of the vehicle. In addition, when one entity receives a message broadcast by one vehicle, the entity can authenticate the pseudo-identity of the vehicle.
(2) Anonymity. Anyone other than TC cannot compute the real identities of vehicles from their pseudo-identities. Even if an adversary corrupts some RSUs and some vehicles, the adversary cannot still disclose real identities of honest vehicles. Anonymity can ensure the inability of an adversary in tracing the vehicle routing [11] .
(3) Unlinkability. Even if an adversary corrupts some RSUs and some OBUs, the adversary cannot judge if the received different messages are emitted by the same vehicle. So, an adversary cannot track an honest vehicle. Vehicle unlinkability means preventing an adversary from judging if the different anonymous communications are involved with the same vehicle.
(4) Traceability. Once any dispute happens, TC can reveal the real identity of the sender of a message very rapidly. Moreover, if necessary, TC can also trace the identity of the certificate issuer RSU.
Cryptographic Assumptions
Now, we review in brief some cryptographic modules.
Definition 1 (bilinear pairings).
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p, Q be a generator of G 1 . Let e be an admissible map from G 1 ×G 1 to G 2 , which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For any
• Non-degenerate:
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute
∈ , and an element 
Succ of any PPT distinguisher A which solves the DBDH problem is negligible.
New Privacy-preserving Mutual Authentication Protocol for VANET
In the section, we present a new privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET. The new protocol consists of the following six components.
Initialization
During the initialization, TC produces the system parameters as follows.
(1) Choose * p Z s ∈ as the master key and a generator Q of G 1 with prime order p.
(2) Compute and publish its public key sQ pk TC = (3) Act as a group manager to issue the group key to RSUs. TC should update its group key and publish the revocation list during a period of time. In addition, system parameters include two hash functions H 1 () mapping any string into a member of 
Multiple Anonymous Certificates Generation
The multiple anonymous certificates generation is subdivided into three phases. When an OBU requests anonymous certificates to the nearest RSU, the OBU execute the following steps.
Step O1: Choose random integers { 1 k , 2 k ,…, n k }, run the probabilistic encryption algorithm to its pseudo identity ' v ID and obtain n pseudonyms
Step O2: Choose n blinding factors, blind its pseudonyms and obtain its blind pseudonyms
Step O3: Determine n public/secret key pairs { ） （
Step O4: Choose n blinding factors, blind n public key. Assume that Step O6: Run the private key encryption algorithm to the blind pseudonyms and the blind public keys:
Step Upon receiving the message from OBU, RSU makes a response as follows.
Step R1: Compute the session key k.
Step R2: Use k to decrypt Cipher and check if the plaintext is { ′ Step R3: If the above messages cannot pass the verification, RSU stops the protocol.
Otherwise, RSU continues to interact with OBU and executes the group blind signature algorithm. Finally, RSU generates a signature on each blind pseudonym and blind public key:
Step R4: Send these signatures ′ i σ to OBU.
After receiving these signatures, the OBU computes the signature ) pk , ID (
Thus, OBU holds n short-time anonymous certificates
ID } from the RSU. Cert , they construct session keys by executing the authenticated key exchange protocol in [13] (for details, see [13] ). Thus, OBU 1 and OBU 2 can use the session keys to communicate with each other.
Communications between the Vehicles

Broadcast
Before OBU broadcasts message m, OBU chooses a new short-time anonymous certificate 
Malicious Participants' Trace
If there exists a dispute, TC traces the OBU and RSU by executing the following operations:
Step 1 Step 3: Trace the vehicle's pseudo-identity 
Security Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
Here we analyze the security of the new privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET in brief. Theorem 1. If the group blind signature () GBSig is secure against the existential forgery under the chosen message attacks and the private key encryption algorithm () k SE is secure, the proposed privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET can provide mutual authentication under the Random Oracle Model and the DBDH assumption. Proof: During the vehicle-to-vehicle communications, the vehicles first send their certificates to each other. And their certificates are verified by the verification of group signature. Then the communication parties start to construct the session keys by the authenticated key exchange protocol in [13] . The authenticated key exchange protocol [13] is proved to be secure in a formal CK security model under the Random Oracle Model and the DBDH assumption. During the vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, the vehicle and the RSU computes their session key by their secret keys. So the RSU can identify the vehicle by the encrypted message. The vehicle can identify the RSU by the group signature. In addition, when one entity receives a message broadcast by one vehicle, the entity can authenticate the pseudo-identity of the vehicle by the certificates. Theorem 2 If the group blind signature () GBSig is secure against the existential forgery under the chosen message attacks the proposed privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET can provide anonymity and unlinkability. σ . This is because the OBU blinds its pseudonyms and public keys at the beginning of the generation of group signature and unblinding the signature. So even if an adversary corrupts some RSUs and some vehicles, the adversary cannot still disclose the real identities of the honest vehicles.
Moreover, any adversary cannot trace the vehicles. The OBU uses the different one-time public keys and one-time pseudonyms each time. Thus an adversary cannot judge if the different anonymous communications are involved with the same vehicle. Theorem 3 The proposed privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET can provide traceability. Proof: The description of malicious participants' trace in Subsection 3.6 demonstrates that TC can reveal the real identity of the vehicle and trace the certificate issuer RSU.
Conclusion
In this paper, an improved privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for vehicle ad hoc networks is proposed. Secure identity-based group blind signature, the private encryption and the public encryption are applied in the new protocol. The proposed privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol for VANET can provide mutual authentication, anonymity and unlinkability under the Random Oracle Model and the DBDH assumption. Moreover, the trusted center can trace efficiently malicious OBUs and RSUs.
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